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Editorial |
Australia’s approach to international human rights
treaties is usually to ratify them but not incorporate them into domestic
law. This conveniently allows us to present a pro-human rights face to the
international community, but to ignore human rights at home. It was surprising, therefore, that
the Government took a different approach to the Rome Statute, the treaty
which set up the International Criminal Court. Australia ratified the
Statute and incorporated it into Australian law by making amendments to
the Australian Criminal Code. The Statute came into force in Australia in
2002 and applies equally to all persons in Australia including the Head of
State, Ministers and government officials. For once, the Australian
position differed from that of the United States, which has refused to
ratify the Rome Statute or participate in the International Criminal
Court. Late in 2006 a group of lawyers that
included myself wrote an opinion concerning the continued detention and
proposed trial of David Hicks. The opinion referred to Division 268
of the Criminal Code which creates an offence to deny a fair trial to a
person who is protected by the Geneva Conventions. It expressed the view
that Hicks is a person protected by the Conventions, as either a prisoner
of war or, consistently with the findings of the United States Supreme
Court in Hamdan v Rumsfeld an otherwise protected person under Common
Article 3. Even the United States has now made this concession for persons
detained at Guantanamo Bay. The opinion examined the proposal to
try Hicks before a Second Military Commission set up by Congress after the
First Commission was struck down by the United States Supreme Court, and
considered whether it could be regarded as providing a fair trial. For Australian purposes the
definition of war crimes committed by conducting unfair and irregular
trials have been expanded in the Criminal Code beyond those contained in
the Rome Statute. This has resulted in the standards for a fair and
regular trial being relatively well defined: • The trial must be conducted by a
“regularly constituted court”; The Australian Criminal Code makes
breach of the requirement to provide a fair trial punishable by
imprisonment for up to ten years. The Code has extraterritorial effect so
that it could apply to the conduct of a trial of David Hicks before a
Military Commission held in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The opinion considered that, like
the First Military Commission, the Second Military Commission is flawed
and cannot provide a fair trial. This is because the Commission is
not structured like a regularly constituted court, and because its rules
contain provisions that are antithetical to a fair trial. These include
provisions for the admissibility of evidence received in secret and not
disclosed to the accused, and evidence obtained by coercion falling short
of torture if the Military Judge considers that it may have probative
value. The delay in bringing charges against Hicks itself also operates to
prevent a fair trial. The Australian Government If the opinion is correct about
these matters, then it follows that the trial of Hicks before the Second
Military Commission constitutes a war crime not only under the Geneva
Conventions but also under Australian law. The difficulty for the
Australian Government is that, under the Australian Criminal Code, to
“counsel” or “urge” another party to conduct a trial that does not meet
the mandated standards can constitute a war crime. The position of Australian
Government Ministers has been to press the United States Government to
proceed with the trial. There is a real danger that by adopting this
course the Ministers are guilty of a crime against Australian law. The opinion was sent to the
Attorney-General in December 2006. The relevant part of his response read: “The legal opinion puts forward a
number of arguments concerning the legality of the Act. The question of
whether the Act complies with the Geneva Conventions, the Supreme Court
decision in Hamdan v Rumsfeld or other legal principles will ultimately be
a matter for the United States Government and the courts.” This is a curious and unsatisfactory
response. It misses the main thrust of the opinion - the effect of
Australian law on persons counselling or urging a trial that doesn’t meet
the mandated standards for a fair trial. It asserts that these are matters
for the United States Government and for the courts, whereas the opinion
holds that these are for the Australian Government. The response seems to
rely on the principle that obligations under international treaties are
not justiciable under Australian law. On 18 January 2007 the United States
released rules for trials conducted by the Second Military
Commission.These rules confirm the criticisms of the Military Commissions
Act made in the opinion. The foreword by the Secretary of Defense says it
all. “The M.M.C [the new Rules] applies
the principles of law and rules of evidence in trial by general courts
martial so far as I have considered practicable or consistent with
military or intelligence activities,”
(emphasis added). Further, in a press statement later
in January, the President of the Law Council of Australia pointed out that
the rules provide that not only could Hicks be convicted on hearsay
evidence but that the rules allow hearsay within hearsay. Many other criticisms could be made
but it is clear that a fair trial cannot be held before the Second
Military Commission. It also appears that the Australian Government is
determined to evade its responsibilities to Hicks to the point of
breaching its own laws. This is a shameful chapter in
Australian history. The Hon Alastair Nicholson AO RFD QC
is a former Chief Justice of the Family Court of Australia, former Judge
Advocate General of the Australian Defence Force and is an Honorary
Professorial Fellow in the Department of Criminology at the University of
Melbourne.
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